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Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00456R000300090015 TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
22 MARCH 1972 CONF

1 OF 1

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

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22 MARCH 1972  
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 12)


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FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

## CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . .	1
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### BREZHNEV SPEECH

Major Foreign Policy Review Discusses President's Trips . . . . .	1
U.S.-Soviet Relations: Pledge of Serious Intent in Talks . . . . .	2
Europe: Plea for FRG Treaty Ratification; Recognition of EEC . . . . .	5
China: Ideological Issues Skirted, Soviet Proposals Cited . . . . .	8
Asia: "Gr wing Interest" in Collective Security in Region . . . . .	11

### COMMUNIST RELATIONS

Moscow Presses Line on Need for Unity, Conformity . . . . .	12
---	----

### INDOCHINA

DRV, PRG Persist in Indirect Attacks on President's PRC Visit . . . . .	15
Prior to Visit DRV Indicated Concern About Cadres' Attitudes . . . . .	18
Brezhnev Supports Indochinese, Calls Aid "International Duty" . . . . .	20
Peking Banquet, Message Mark Anniversary of Sihanouk Front . . . . .	23
Sihanouk Government, DRV, PRC Condemn Incursion into Cambodia . . . . .	25
DPRK Signs Military Aid Agreement with Sihanouk's Government . . . . .	27
DRV Condemns U.S. Air Strikes Against North During March . . . . .	28
Paris: U.S. "Step-up of War," "Sabotage" of Talks Assailed . . . . .	29

### MIDDLE EAST

Brezhnev Lauds Ties With Arabs; USSR Cautious on Husayn Plan . . . . .	31
Peking Renounces Husayn Plan, East European Media Critical . . . . .	33

### SOUTH ASIA

USSR, Pakistan Move Toward Normalization of Relations . . . . .	36
Close Soviet-Afghan Relations Overshadow Minor Differences . . . . .	39
Moscow Hails Gandhi Election Victory in India . . . . .	40

CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 1 -

## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 13 - 19 MARCH 1972

Moscow (3027 items)

Indochina	(8%)	14%
[Solidarity Week	(0.3%)	10%]
China	(9%)	6%
[Nixon Visit	(4%)	2%]
Italian CP Congress	(0.1%)	6%
Pakistani President	(--)	5%
Bhutto in USSR		
Afghan Premier in	(--)	3%
USSR		
Soviet Trade Union	(--)	3%
Congress		

Peking (1530 items)

Domestic Issues	(46%)	41%
Indochina	(23%)	22%
[ARVN Incursion	(--)	6%]
into Cambodia		
[Sihanouk Return	(9%)	5%]
to Peking		
[Vietnam	(7%)	3%]
[Laos	(5%)	3%]
Husayn Proposal on	(--)	7%
Jordan Federation		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 1 -

## BREZHNEV SPEECH

### MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW DISCUSSES PRESIDENT'S TRIPS

In his most comprehensive foreign policy review since his pre-election speech last June, CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev on 20 March put in a plea for key elements of his detente policy, most notably focusing on Europe and on relations with the PRC and the United States during a crucial period of summitry. Making another move to enhance his personal role and authority in foreign affairs, Brezhnev delivered his major address on an occasion--the 15th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions--that previously had served as a forum only for the trade union chiefs.\*

In Moscow's first elite comment on President Nixon's China trip, Brezhnev deferred judgment on the results of the visit--a subject on which the Soviets have been marking time--while implying that the President's Moscow negotiations will show the real import of the Sino-U.S. summit meeting. He said "we are in no hurry" to give a definitive assessment of the President's talks in China, but he took the opportunity to voice concern over the implications of the visit for third parties and to get in sarcastic digs at both the United States and China. In an apparent allusion to the President's May trip to Moscow and possibly to the return of chief Soviet negotiator Ilichev to the Sino-Soviet talks in Peking, Brezhnev said that the future, "perhaps the near future, will show how matters stand, and we will then draw appropriate practical conclusions" about the Sino-U.S. summit.

Brezhnev preceded his discussion of the President's forthcoming visit to Moscow by defining Soviet foreign policy, in pro forma language, as one that combines "a firm rebuff to imperialism's aggressive designs" with "a constructive approach to ripe international problems," and "implacability in ideological struggle" with "readiness to develop mutually advantageous relations" with noncommunist states. Appraising the prospects for Soviet-U.S. negotiations in carefully measured but positive

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\* The last two previous trade union congresses, in February-March 1968 and October-November 1963, had been addressed by AUCCTU chairmen Shelepin and Grishin, respectively. Both devoted a relatively small portion of their speeches to foreign affairs. Shelepin opened this year's congress and delivered a formal report.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 2 -

terms, Brezhnev said it is incumbent on the two sides to "establish a certain degree of mutually advantageous cooperation" in view of the importance of Soviet-U.S. relations for "the entire international situation." He asserted that the USSR approaches the forthcoming summit talks in a "businesslike, realistic way" and attaches "serious importance" to the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), which resume in Helsinki on 28 March.

In a lengthy discussion of European issues, which he said pose "a task of major historic scope," Brezhnev stressed the importance of ratification of the Soviet-FRG treaty in stark terms, declaring that West Germany faces a choice between "a policy of peace and a policy of war." He also repeated the call for a European security conference, in the process making a notable move toward a more forthcoming position on the European Economic Community.

Brezhnev took the occasion to renew the proposal for an Asian collective security system that he first advanced in June 1969 at a time of acute Sino-Soviet tension. With the great-power rivalry in Asia clearly in mind, he paid high tribute to Soviet-Indian relations and took note of the "turn for the better" in relations with Japan. Against this background, he called on "all interested states" to take the road of collective security in Asia rather than the road of military blocs or of pitting some states against others. This was the point of departure for his discussion of President Nixon's visit to the PRC.

#### U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: PLEDGE OF SERIOUS INTENT IN TALKS

While registering concern over the war in Indochina, U.S. "connivance" with Israel in the Middle East, and U.S. "intrigues" in the Mediterranean, Brezhnev took the occasion to reaffirm--in language reminiscent of his 30 March 1971 report to the 24th CPSU Congress--that improved relations between Washington and Moscow are both desirable and possible. At the same time, he stated that such an improvement in relations must not be at the expense of third countries.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 3 -

It was in this context that Brezhnev referred to the importance of President Nixon's trip to the USSR--which Soviet media on the 16th had announced would begin 22 May--and offered the assurance that the USSR approaches the talks "from businesslike, realistic positions." Kosygin is the only other Soviet leader to have publicly mentioned the President's trip: In response to a question at an Ottawa press conference on 20 October 1971, as reported in IZVESTIYA, he expressed hope that the President's journeys to China and the USSR "would lead to the peaceful resolution of questions and to the relaxation of tension in the world, and not to military stress. This is what we will be striving for in our talks with President Nixon."

In the vein of propaganda in October, following the initial announcement that the President would be visiting the USSR, Brezhnev observed that the state of U.S.-Soviet relations is important for the life of the peoples of the two countries, "as well as for the entire international situation, for its further development in the direction of lasting peace or in the direction of growing military danger." For this reason, he added, it is "our duty" to find areas in which it is possible, "without retreating from the principles of our policy, to establish a certain degree of mutually advantageous cooperation in the interest of the peoples of both countries and the strengthening of universal peace." Cautiously, he ventured the opinion that the forthcoming summit will show whether the quest for such fields of cooperation is feasible.

Brezhnev's reference to the importance of improved U.S.-Soviet relations for the "entire international situation" is consistent with the observation in his June pre-election speech that improved bilateral ties would contribute "to the cause of peace and international security." It stops short of the formulation used during the Khrushchev era on the prime, pivotal importance of U.S.-Soviet relations for world peace.\* Soviet spokesmen in the post-Khrushchev period have become defensive on this score--clearly in response to

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\* Among other high-level spokesmen who broached the theme during that period, Foreign Minister Gromyko stated before the Supreme Soviet on 13 December 1962 that "if there is cooperation and trust between the Soviet Union and the United States, there will be peace; if there is agreement between Nikita Khrushchev . . . and John Kennedy . . . there will be a solution of international problems on which mankind's destinies depend."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 4 -

Chinese badgering. Most recently, Kosygin reacted in his 9 June 1971 pre-election speech to Peking's line on Soviet-U.S. collusion to dominate world affairs: The USSR's readiness to discuss a wide range of issues with the United States, the Soviet premier insisted, does not have "anything in common with the so-called 'policy of two superpowers.'"

Now, underscoring the global importance of close U.S.-Soviet relations, Brezhnev at the same time derided a statement made by President Nixon in the PRC on Sino-U.S. relations. Without attributing the statement to the President, he asked rhetorically how one should assess "the statement made at a banquet in Shanghai that 'today our two peoples--that is, the American and Chinese--hold in their hands the future of the whole world.'"

**SALT AND DISARMAMENT** Brezhnev's assurance that the USSR attaches "serious importance" to the negotiations on strategic arms limitation constitutes his first public comment on SALT since his June address. As in June, he stated that the key to the talks' success is recognition by both sides of the principle of "equal security."

The Soviet leader prefaced his remarks on SALT and disarmament with a complaint about the U.S. defense budget, which he said provides "for a considerable growth in military spending, especially on long-term programs of strategic armaments." He observed that the USSR cannot ignore this fact in formulating its foreign and defense policies. Soviet propaganda has been waging a sustained attack on U.S. defense policies. Most recently, an article in the 15 March RED STAR by Engineer Major L. Petrov, quoting from the foreign press, focused on the development of MIRV's as further evidence of U.S. implementation of "a nuclear-missile arms race unparalleled in scale and tempo."

Brezhnev asserted that the USSR, for its part, favors the reaching of a "mutually acceptable agreement" at SALT, and he praised the accords of last September "on measures to lessen the risk of nuclear war." He added--without elaboration--that the Soviet Union "comes out for other nuclear powers to become participants in such an arrangement in some form."

Noting the USSR's continuing struggle for disarmament, Brezhnev recalled that its specific proposals were set out in the 30 March 1971 report to the CPSU congress, singling out the call for a world disarmament conference and a convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 5 -

## EUROPE: PLEA FOR FRG TREATY RATIFICATION; RECOGNITION OF EEC

Brezhnev devoted the longest portion of his foreign policy remarks to issues of European security, delivering a stern lecture to Bonn--with overtones of concern and a sense of urgency--on possible consequences of nonratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, the cornerstone of current Soviet policy in Europe. He also repeated the Soviet call for an "all-European conference of states," not explicitly adding the usual stipulation that it must convene in 1972 but saying it is now necessary to reach agreement on a date and "to determine jointly the main directions" of the conference's work.

Addressing himself directly to the heated West German debate on ratification of the two treaties, Brezhnev came down hard on the Bonn opposition while seeking at the same time to reassure and encourage the Brandt-Scheel coalition--and perhaps any wavering CDU/CSU Bundestag deputies--by what amounts to a breakthrough Soviet statement of recognition of the reality of the European Economic Community (EEC).

THE COMMON MARKET      Rebutting one of the Bonn opposition's three fundamental criticisms of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties,\* Brezhnev labeled as "absurd" the notion that the USSR's European policy in general and its call for an all-European security conference in particular "are directed at laying a mine under the EEC." This notion, he said, "evidently requires a certain clarification." He went on to state that the Soviet Union "is far from ignoring the actually existing situation in Western Europe, including the existence of such an economic grouping of capitalist countries as the 'Common Market' and its evolution"--a clear allusion to the expansion of the EEC to include Great Britain, Ireland, Norway, and Denmark. Elaborating on the type of relationship he foresees for the Soviet bloc's relations with

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\* The opposition's three basic objections are 1) that the USSR wants to undermine the EEC and should be made to disavow any such intent formally in the treaties; 2) that the two treaties surrender the German people's right to self-determination and to a possible future reunification of the two German states; and 3) that they contain no guarantees on such questions as the free exchange of ideas and travel between the two Germanys.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 6 -

the EEC, Brezhnev continued:

Our relations with the participants in this grouping, naturally, will depend on the extent to which they, on their part, recognize the realities existing in the socialist part of Europe, specifically, the interests of the CEMA member-countries. We are for equality in economic relations and against discrimination.

The Soviet leader's watershed statements in effect reverse the implied denunciation of the newly enlarged EEC in the most recent Soviet bloc official statement, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee's Prague declaration of 26 January 1972. Apparently contrived to influence the Bundestag debate on ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, and reflecting Moscow's concern about ratification, Brezhnev's comments on the EEC also came three weeks after Western news media had reported Romania's application to the EEC--unpublicized in Bucharest's own media--for special consideration as a developing country to export manufactured goods to Common Market countries without paying duty. And Brezhnev's remarks came on the heels of Peking comment picturing the enlarged Common Market as a more closely united force capable of challenging Soviet and U.S. dominance in Europe.\*

THE FRG TREATIES      Bringing up "the rather acute struggle" in the FRG over ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, Brezhnev bluntly took to task the "politicians who oppose the treaties and even try to question the very possibility of a genuine reconciliation and a development of normal relations between the FRG and the socialist countries." Asking rhetorically what it is that the opponents of the treaties want, he asserted that they seek a revision of the clauses which outline the inviolability of European borders. "But is it not clear," he asked, "that the opponents of the treaties do not have and will not have anybody with whom to negotiate a revision of borders? This is not a subject of discussion either now or in the future. The borders of socialist countries are inviolable, and in this respect the treaties only reflect the existing reality."

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\* See the TRENDS of 16 February, pages 21-25, for a discussion of this PRC comment and of Moscow's reactions to Chinese views on Europe.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 7 -

After denouncing the treaties' opponents for trying to weaken the "independent, sovereign, socialist" GDR, the Soviet leader proceeded to drive home to the West Germans the consequences of nonratification:

The FRG now faces a responsible choice which will determine the destinies of its people and the attitude taken toward it by other states for many years. This is a choice between cooperation and confrontation, between detente and fanning of tensions. In the final analysis, this is a choice between a policy of peace and a policy of war.

As if further to underscore the depth of the USSR's concern and the seriousness of its purpose, Brezhnev followed up the above statement with a reminder that it has not been easy for the Soviet Union to improve relations with West Germany because of the lasting memories of World War II. But he avowed that "we sincerely and seriously approach the matter of improving relations with the FRG." His remark that "this is not a simple question for our country" seemed to carry overtones of an acknowledgment of the vital importance of success of the European detente policy for the Brezhnev leadership--and hence of the critical importance ascribed to ratification of the treaties as the vital link in that policy.

Brezhnev's public rebuttal of the Bonn opposition's arguments came on the heels of successive Soviet moves to buttress Brandt's effort to get the treaties ratified:

+ On 15 March, according to the West German DPA, Soviet Ambassador Falin delivered to FRG Foreign Minister Scheel a USSR Government letter dated 9 March which included a German translation of the 20 March PRAVDA Observer [nablyudatel] article stating that there are no differences between the German and Russian texts of the Moscow treaty. An accompanying letter from Falin reportedly said this PRAVDA article should be viewed as an official statement of the USSR Government.\* Although Moscow media did not acknowledge this demarche, a Moscow radio commentary by Bonn correspondent Glazunov, broadcast in German and East European languages on 16 March, argued that despite "the clearcut and distinct

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\* See the TRENDS of 15 March 1972, pages 30-32, for a discussion of the PRAVDA Observer article.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 8 -

statement made by the Soviet side that the Russian and German texts of the treaty are identical, that the treaty contains clear, absolutely unequivocal provisions which do not allow different interpretations," the CDU/CSU leaders still resort to their "falsifications and fabricated information regarding the interpretation of the treaty."

+ On the 16th Brandt informed the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee that the Soviet Government would officially inform the USSR Supreme Soviet, where the Moscow treaty is now under study, of the "Letter on German Unity" sent by Scheel to Gromyko at the time of the signing of the treaty on 12 August 1970; the letter stated that the treaty does not conflict with the FRG's aspirations for reunification of the German nation through self-determination. Moscow media have not directly acknowledged Brandt's statement. TASS omitted any reference to German unification both in a report on the FRG Chancellor's remarks to the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee and in a report on comments made by FRG press spokesman Ahlers the same day. But routine Moscow propaganda has discounted the idea of a unified German state and attributed the fact of the division to policies followed by the CDU/CSU and the Western allies spanning 25 years of postwar history.

#### CHINA: IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES SKIRTED, SOVIET PROPOSALS CITED

In discussing President Nixon's China trip, Brezhnev chose an approach to the sensitive triangular relationship that largely avoided or sidestepped ideological issues while stressing that "actual deeds" will reveal the implications of the Sino-U.S. summit meeting. Brezhnev's speech contained calls for improved relations on a "mutually advantageous" basis with both the PRC and the United States, citing the President's forthcoming Moscow visit in the latter connection, but he made no direct mention of the Sino-Soviet talks in Peking--a subject ignored in Soviet elite comment in recent months. He did, however, cite "specific and constructive" Soviet proposals "long known" to the Chinese, and his speech coincided with the return to Peking of the chief Soviet negotiator at the talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev, after a three-month absence.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 9 -

In contrast to his more forthcoming approach to Soviet-U.S. relations, looking forward to the May summit negotiations, Brezhnev indicated that the negotiating ball is now in the Chinese court rather than suggesting that Ilichev was arriving with fresh proposals. But he made an ideological concession to the Chinese which, taken together with his willingness to suspend judgment on the Sino-U.S. talks and to await future developments, could be read as a bid to Peking to put Sino-Soviet relations on a less hostile basis despite the over-riding rivalry between the two sides. Noting that the Sino-U.S. communique endorsed the principles of peaceful coexistence and that the Chinese are calling for Sino-Soviet relations to be based on these principles,\* Brezhnev expressed--with an air of resignation--a readiness to accept this heterodox basis for relations between communist states. Having made this concession to the triangular realities, he was able to disclose for the first time that the Soviets had presented proposals on nonaggression--which itself would be heterodox in relations between communist countries--as well as on settlement of border issues and on improving bilateral relations. "It is up to the Chinese side now," he asserted.

Significantly, this list of proposals "long known" to the Chinese included one on "non-use of force" in the version of Brezhnev's speech broadcast live over the Moscow radio, but that particular proposal was omitted in the textual versions carried by TASS and in the Soviet press. Such tampering with the text suggests that the Soviets may have had second or conflicting thoughts about appearing to accede to Chinese demands for a removal of Soviet military pressure along the border, and thus to undercut the implied threat of Soviet punitive measures should the Chinese step too far out of line. In view of Brezhnev's willingness in the past to associate his authority with counsels of restraint toward the Chinese, Kremlin hardliners may have drawn a tighter line on how far the Soviets should go in making ideological concessions to Peking. Ironically, it may also have been pointed out to Brezhnev that the interventionist doctrine of limited sovereignty associated with his

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\* The 7 October 1969 PRC statement agreeing to open border negotiations with the USSR first proposed that their relations should be based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. This line was repeated most recently in the Chinese message on the October Revolution anniversary last November.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 10 -

name would be diluted by publicly undertaking not to use force against a wayward communist state. Whatever the reasons underlying the change of the text, a version broadcast by Radio Moscow to China also omitted the reference to non-use of force while including the other proposals.

In calling merely for a "settlement of border issues," Brezhnev failed to repeat the offer--uniquely contained in an authoritative "I. Aleksandrov" article on the Chinese party's 50th anniversary last July--to conclude a comprehensive "new border treaty" with Peking. In recent months Soviet comment has largely skirted the border talks. Thus, delivering the keynote address at the October Revolution ceremonies last November, Grishin referred to Soviet initiatives in normalizing Sino-Soviet relations but failed to mention the talks. A year ago, as in Brezhnev's 30 March report to the CPSU Congress, the Soviet leaders referred to the talks as proceeding "slowly."

In his 20 March speech to the trade union congress, Brezhnev quoted from the CPSU Congress resolution on China, citing its statements that Moscow will uphold Marxist-Leninist principles and rebuff Peking's "slandorous" charges while seeking normalization of relations with the PRC. Consistent with his general avoidance of ideological issues, he did not recall the party congress resolution's attack on Peking's ideological line or on Chinese "splitting" efforts within the international communist movement.

Recent Soviet comment has been pressing the ideological campaign against Peking, with repeated charges that Maoism is one of the most dangerous deviations in the history of the communist movement; but Brezhnev's restraint and his willingness to make ideological concessions suggest a concern not to close the negotiating door on one side of the triangle while there is movement along the other sides. It may have been with his own colleagues in mind that he noted the "many diverse views" being expressed concerning the Sino-U.S. summit, but he insisted that the Soviets are in "no hurry" to reach a final assessment and will see what the future brings.

ILICHEV IN PEKING      Moscow, but not the Chinese, reported Ilichev's return to Peking, where he was met at the airport by Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung, the chief Chinese negotiator at the talks. The Chinese, on the other hand, have disclosed lack of progress on the border problem, NCNA reporting promptly on the 21st that the Sino-Soviet

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 11 -

Joint Commission for Navigation on Boundary Rivers had failed to reach an agreement during its session held from 6 December to 21 March. At the conclusion of the commission's previous session in late 1970, a TASS report suggested that some accord had been reached, but a subsequent NCNA account tersely noted that the two sides "did not reach agreement" on the problems discussed. Moscow has not yet reported the recent session of the commission.

#### ASIA: "GROWING INTEREST" IN COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN REGION

Brezhnev's discussion of President Nixon's China trip was preceded by a wide-ranging review of Moscow's Asian policy that concluded with an offer of cooperation with "all states" to translate the idea of Asian collective security into reality. Brezhnev had originally broached the notion of an Asian collective security system in June 1969, during a period of acute Sino-Soviet hostility. His current revival of the proposal reflects Moscow's concern over the effects in that region of recent Sino-U.S. developments. As he explained the situation in his 20 March speech, it is becoming "increasingly clear" that the real road to security in Asia is one of good-neighborly cooperation among "all interested states" rather than that of military blocs or pitting some states against others. Six days earlier, in a speech during the visit of the Afghan prime minister, Premier Kosygin remarked in a discussion of Asian collective security that it would "in no way be directed against any state."

Brezhnev's speech took special note of two countries, India and Japan, which have figured in Soviet moves over the past year that were reactive in part to Sino-U.S. developments. Thus he attached "particular importance" to Soviet relations with India, citing the treaty that was signed shortly after the announcement of Peking's invitation to President Nixon and extolling Prime Minister Gandhi as an "outstanding leader." He also took note of the "turn for the better" in Moscow's relations with Japan, an allusion to the results of Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Tokyo a month before President Nixon's visit to China. Noting that Japan and the USSR had agreed to hold talks on a peace treaty, Brezhnev declared that a full normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations would meet the interests not only of the two countries but also those of peace and security in the Far East and the Pacific area.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 12 -

## COMMUNIST RELATIONS

### MOSCOW PRESSES LINE ON NEED FOR UNITY, CONFORMITY

Moscow's insistent current stress on the need for coordination to develop common positions in the Soviet bloc is reflected in Brezhnev's statement, in his 20 March trade union congress speech, that "we have a common coordinated line with countries of the socialist community on virtually all the main questions of world politics." The statement appears against the backdrop of a spate of Soviet press and journal articles and statements by Moscow's orthodox East European allies underscoring the need for unity and ideological conformity in the face of the schismatic impact of "Maoism." Notably, SED Politburo member Hermann Axen's 10 March PRAVDA article discoursed on the primacy of international over national interests and the need to work out "common" positions.\*

The concerted propaganda offensive was buttressed in a joint communique by Moscow's staunchest allies, Czechoslovakia's Husak and Bulgaria's Zhivkov, following the latter's 13-17 March visit to Prague. The Bulgarian leader had been in Warsaw from 25 to 28 February--part of the rash of East European leaders' travels in the wake of the 25-26 January Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Prague. Atypically for such a bilateral document on talks between Soviet bloc leaders in the recent period, the lengthy Zhivkov-Husak communique included a direct attack on Peking. It also contained clear echoes of Axen's PRAVDA article.

TASS carried an extensive summary of the communique, and on 20 March Moscow underscored the importance it attached to the Zhivkov-Husak meeting with a PRAVDA article by V. Gerasimov, entitled "Cofighters," which again highlighted the communique's main points, including the attack on China. Soviet media routinely publicize but do not normally devote articles or commentaries to such bilateral East European meetings. In line with Moscow's current stress on coordination, the article drew a moral at the outset to the effect that the socialist states are demonstrating the advantages of "the new type of international relations based on truly comradely interaction, equal rights, and fraternity." It added that "the practice of our time invariably proves that political and economic coordination and joint action

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\* See the 15 March TRENDS, pages 17-21.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 13 -

multiply the forces of the socialist countries." Concluding that "the socialist community is the living embodiment of Lenin's ideas of internationalism," Gerasimov declared that the closer ties between Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria would serve the cause of "the further rallying of the family of the fraternal peoples of the socialist countries."

ZHIVKOV COMMUNIQUE      The communique on Zhivkov's "official friendly" visit to Prague, where he headed a party-government delegation that included Premier Todorov, was longer and tougher than the communique issued at the end of the Bulgarian party leader's "friendly" visit to Warsaw in February. The latter document stressed "socialist internationalism," solidarity with the Soviet Union, and communist unity, but was devoid of blatant polemics and did not mention the Chinese. Both documents recorded a cordial atmosphere in the meetings and full unanimity on all questions discussed.

Stating that Zhivkov and Husak discussed "urgent" questions of the international movement, the communique on their talks proclaimed "unbreakable friendship with the Soviet Union" and socialist unity based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism to be the guarantees of successful socialist building. It hailed the results of the June 1969 international communist conference in Moscow--also cited in Axen's article--as a "firm foundation" for the two parties' present and future activities. And it termed the 24th CPSU Congress "a mighty impetus" for the cohesion of the international movement and "the fighting ability of the world anti-imperialist front."

On the score of China, the communique said both leaders "resolutely condemned the adventurist anti-Soviet splitting policy of the present leadership of the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China, which is leveled against the unity" of the socialist countries and the world communist movement and which "immeasurably impairs the cause of socialism" and the anti-imperialist struggle.

KOMMUNIST ON      Rightwing revisionism is the principal target of the  
REVISIONISM      article on "The Falsifiers of the Theory of  
Scientific Communism and their Bankruptcy" in issue  
No. 3 of the CPSU's KOMMUNIST, signed to the press 22 February and  
now available in translation. Prepared by the Central Committee's  
Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the article assails revisionism  
across the left-right spectrum and mentions Maoism specifically only

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 14 -

once. Its main thrust is at rightist deviants of the ilk of the Czechoslovak reformers of 1968, the "Manifesto group" expelled from the Italian Communist Party, the French communist dissident Roger Garaudy, and the Fischer-Marek group expelled from the Austrian party. All of these had been singled out in NEW TIMES No. 8 by A. Sobolev, head of the section on History of the International Communist Movement of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, as incorrigible "revisionists" properly purged from their parties' leadership. Sobolev again lashed out at opportunism and revisionism in issue No. 3 of the international affairs monthly MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, signed to the press on the same day as KOMMUNIST.

The KOMMUNIST article, attacking what it terms a revisionist denial of "the international nature of Leninist organizational principles," expounds on orthodox principles for organization of the individual communist party entity. Focusing on what it brands as rightwing distortions of the dialectical unity of "democracy" and "centralism" in the party, it emphasizes that the backbone of Leninist doctrine on party organization is "the principle of democratic centralism, which insures the party's ideological and organizational unity." The article underscores the importance of a "high order of organization and discipline" in the party. It broaches the unity theme in quoting Lenin to the effect that "we are not a discussion club . . . . We must primarily struggle under the most difficult conditions, and therefore we must rally closely together."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 15 -

## INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist media have continued their vitriolic criticism of President Nixon's policies and indirect attacks on his China visit. Both Hanoi and the Front currently use the anniversary of the 19 March 1950 anti-U.S. demonstrations in Saigon as a peg for such attacks, with an editorial in NHAN DAN aiming an unusually sharp jab at Peking. After quoting the President's statements in the Sino-U.S. communique, without attribution, it said that "such a deceitful contention could only be accepted by those who do not understand the truth of our time and go counter to our time's conscience."

An unsigned article in the January-February issue of the main journal of the DRV party's propaganda department, now available in translation, seemed to have been aimed at providing ideological guidance for party members in anticipation of the President's China trip. Observing that socialist countries must take into account both national interests and Marxist-Leninist principles, it stressed that the DRV party should educate its members about the party's independent and sovereign line.

Brezhnev's remarks on Indochina in his 20 March Moscow speech were relatively restrained in criticizing the United States, in keeping with the general thrust of the speech and its stress on a policy of detente. The Soviet leader prefaced his brief comments on Indochina and the Middle East with the avowal that "the most important direction of Soviet foreign policy is the struggle to liquidate hotbeds of war." Other propaganda has not shown comparable restraint, and an 18 March PRAVDA editorial pegged to the Indochinese "solidarity" week criticized U.S. policy in harshly graphic language.

Peking put on a major show of support for Sihanouk, with all of the fully active Chinese Politburo members attending a banquet on 19 March marking the second anniversary of his arrival in Peking after his ouster. Chou En-lai's banquet speech, reaffirming Peking's "unshakable" backing for the war effort, was notable for accusing unnamed powers of seeking a Cambodian compromise that would split Sihanouk's front and undermine unity in Indochina. A Chinese message on the FUNK anniversary again pledged support in the war but omitted last year's reference to China as "the great rear area." Peking gave minimal attention to this year's Vietnam "anti-U.S. day," in contrast to the prominent treatment accorded the event last year.

## DRV, PRG PERSIST IN INDIRECT ATTACKS ON PRESIDENT'S PRC VISIT

HANOI Both Hanoi and the Front have continued the practice, initiated with the 3 March NHAN DAN Commentator article, of criticizing the President's visit to China by derisively

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 16 -

quoting remarks from his speeches and from the Sino-U.S. communique without so identifying them. The anniversary of the 19 March 1950 anti-U.S. demonstrations in Saigon\* was used as a peg for the most recent attacks and to call attention to the vanguard role of the Vietnamese in the struggle against "U.S. imperialism."

A VNA version of the NHAN DAN anniversary editorial used quotation marks in such a way as to point up the citation of language in the Sino-U.S. communique:

While continuing to cling to his "eight-point proposal" to step up "Vietnamization" and materialize neocolonialism, Nixon boasted: "The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention . . . ."

. . . in the absence of a negotiated settlement, the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina.

These quotations were followed by a passage that went beyond other propaganda in implicitly criticizing Peking. "Such a deceitful contention," it said, "could only be accepted by those who do not understand the truth of our time and go counter to our time's conscience." Inexplicably, this passage was not included in the first monitored version of the editorial--a Hanoi radio domestic service broadcast at 0430 GMT, some three hours before the VNA transmission. Moreover, the broadcast truncated the quotations attributed to the President, saying only that "Nixon boasted that the United States stresses that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their own destiny without outside intervention."

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\* In addition to issuing editorials on the anti-U.S. anniversary, Hanoi marked the event with lower-level comment and with a 15 March meeting held by the Hanoi Fatherland Front Committee and the Liaison Committee of Saigon, Hue, and Hanoi Natives. Front media offered routine comment and publicized an anniversary letter from NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho to southern "compatriots and combatants."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 17 -

However, a later Hanoi radio domestic service broadcast--at 1430 GMT--repeated the passages as rendered in the VNA version. The inconsistency suggests disarray or even disagreement over whether NHAN DAN's strong criticism of the Chinese should be called to the attention of the mass of North Vietnamese radio listeners.

NHAN DAN followed up the description of those who could accept the President's contentions as not understanding "the truth of our time" with the assertion that the Vietnamese people, through their 20-year struggle against U.S. "aggression," have "clearly seen the truth and acted in accordance with that conscience." The editorial went on to laud the PRG peace proposal as the correct stand for Vietnamese self-determination. And it pledged that in the face of the unchanged nature of U.S. imperialism, the Vietnamese are determined to pursue the struggle.

An editorial in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN marking the 19 March anniversary also stressed the persistent Vietnamese struggle against the United States. Unlike NHAN DAN, it did not cite the President's statements in Peking, but it pointedly charged that the imperialists have attempted "to woo each country individually" and that President Nixon has stepped up the efforts to divide the socialist camp since he came to power. The army paper repeated Hanoi's standard contention that U.S. imperialism remains "enemy number one," and it called the Nixon Doctrine "a comprehensive strategic plan aimed at coping with the socialist camp and the national liberation and workers' movements." Declaring that "the present era entrusts a glorious historic mission to the Vietnamese people," it observed that they are "proud of being the strike force on the front against the aggressive U.S. imperialists."

Allusions to the President's statements in the Sino-U.S. communique recurred at a 22 March Hanoi meeting--attended by Defense Minister Giap--marking the second anniversary of the establishment of Sihanouk's front and launching a week of solidarity with the Cambodian people. Hoang Minh Giam, member of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee, routinely assailed the U.S. eight-point peace plan and added: "Recently, Nixon deceitfully stated that if there were no negotiated solution, the United States would ultimately withdraw all its forces from Indochina in accord with 'the right of self-determination of the Indochinese peoples.'"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 18 -

THE FRONT      Front media's sniping at the President's statements during his China trip included an LPA editorial on the 18th, pegged to the 19 March 1950 Saigon demonstrations, which said that "right at a time when he was clamoring about his 'long march for peace,' Nixon ordered air and naval forces to bomb both North and South Vietnam as well as Cambodia and Laos." And a 20 March Liberation Radio commentary on the Nixon Doctrine ridiculed "the Nixon clique's merchandising of peace," observing that the President has now spoken about "our children's future," about "the removal of walls separating one people from another," and about "the building of new order in the world in which nations and peoples can live in peace and mutual respect."

The radio commentary also referred to Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green's tour following the President's China visit. It said that the President, "after ballyhooing about Indochinese self-determination," sent Green to Asian capitals including Saigon, where he said that U.S. policy toward Vietnam would remain unchanged and that the United States would not reduce its commitments to maintain the Thieu administration. The commentary echoed the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial's charge that the President is trying to pit one socialist country against the other in order to divide the camp.

#### PRIOR TO VISIT DRV INDICATED CONCERN ABOUT CADRES' ATTITUDE

The January-February issue of TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING), an organ of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Central Committee's Department of Propaganda and Training, followed the pattern of other Hanoi propaganda in avoiding any mention of the President's forthcoming visits to Peking and Moscow while charging that he is "wooing one socialist country after another" and "sowing disunity among various countries" with the ultimate aim of weakening the socialist camp.\* Entitled "Intensify the Teaching of the Sense of Independence and Sovereignty to Our Cadres, Party Members, and

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\* Hanoi's only known explicit reference to the President's planned visits to Peking & Moscow was in the November issue of another journal of the Propaganda and Training Department, THOI SU PHO THONG (CURRENT EVENTS). That journal, believed to be aimed at a lower-level audience than TUYEN HUAN, mentioned the visits and charged the President with "using vague hints to create the illusion that trips will help the United States resolve the Vietnam problem."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 19 -

People," the article clearly reflected concern over the impact of the President's moves on North Vietnamese cadres and party members. Not only did it go to great lengths to explain the reasons for policy differences among socialist countries and to defend the DRV's "independent and sovereign" line, but it also directly acknowledged that at least some cadres and party members had not responded correctly to the existence of differences in the socialist camp.

The article defined the grounds on which policy differences could justifiably exist between socialist countries when it pointed out that each party must develop policies that accord with the national interests of its own country. At the same time, TUYEN HUAN spelled out universal standards for party policy which provide a theoretical base for Hanoi's attack on the PRC's rapprochement with the United States. It warned that "a genuine revolutionary party" will cause its revolution to deviate from the right course and to court failure if it departs from "the general principles of Marxism-Leninism." And it argued pointedly that at a time when President Nixon is attempting with "his 'Doctrine'" to foment disunity among socialist countries, it is particularly important to maintain the stand of proletarian internationalism and the correct strategic line--opposing the United States, strengthening and protecting the socialist camp, and supporting national liberation movements and proletarian revolutions. "It is the responsibility of all communists and revolutionaries throughout the world," the article asserted, "to direct the spearhead at U.S. imperialism, whose vivid manifestation in the present era is the 'Nixon Doctrine.'"

The article maintained that the VWP--with an "independent, sovereign, and creative political line" and through its own anti-U.S. resistance--"has correctly settled and is correctly settling the relationship between our people's interests and those of the world revolutionary movement." It acknowledged that at one time, when "newly founded communist parties were less experienced," the assistance of "the communist international and the Soviet Union" in the shaping of political lines had been "of very great significance." But it went on to discount this factor of foreign guidance at the present time, noting the international communist movement's growth in size and experience in the half century since the October Revolution and describing the movement today as marked by independence and equality of all parties.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 20 -

The importance of the DRV party's independence was also stressed in concluding passages on guidance to be given to cadres and party members. Here the article reflected apparent problems with at least some elements when it said that "most cadres and party members" have demonstrated "steadfast political standards" and confidence in the party's line in the face of persistent differences in the socialist camp over viewpoints and lines on the "fundamental problems of the era." It went on to maintain that "the correct 'reaction' to the political upheavals and the complex developments in the world situation in the past have further testified to our cadres' and party members' political capacity and their steadfast awareness and ideological standards." But it added that "we are not complacent with the results achieved," and it advocated that greater importance be attached to "improving our cadres' and party members' sense of independence and sovereignty and, especially, to teaching them our party's independent and sovereign political line." In one of its many quotations from Le Duan, the article at this point cited his observation in 1965 that only when independence is instilled in cadres and party members can they become "deeply imbued with the party Central Committee's lines," can they "keep themselves from staggering or wavering," and can they "fully comply" with the Central Committee's lines.\*

#### BREZHNEV SUPPORTS INDOCHINESE, CALLS AID "INTERNATIONAL DUTY"

In his major foreign policy speech on 20 March, Brezhnev leveled only brief and pro forma criticism at U.S. policy in Indochina--an approach consistent with his stress on a policy of detente and his general restraint in anticipation of the President's May visit to the USSR. In his last broad discussion of foreign policy issues, in his pre-election speech last June, Brezhnev had mentioned Indochina only in passing in a general denunciation of the presence of U.S. naval fleets in the Mediterranean and off the shores of China and Indochina. However, in his 30 March 1971

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\* TUYEN HUAN's footnote on the source of this quotation reads: "Le Duan; 'We Will Certainly Win and the Enemy Will Certainly Be Defeated,' Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1965." This publication is not available, but the statement was contained in a July 1965 speech by Le Duan which was excerpted in the 8 September 1965 NHAN DAN and the October 1965 HOC TAP.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 21 -

report to the CPSU Congress he had discussed U.S. "crimes" and the "shame" of America in Indochina in graphic and emotional terms and had described the Vietnamization policy as "plans to destroy Vietnamese through the hands of Vietnamese in the interests of Washington."

Brezhnev observed in the 20 March speech that President Nixon has admitted that the war in Indochina is the longest and most difficult in America's history, adding that it has shown "the entire untenability of the imperialist policy on aggression and oppression of the peoples." He expressed confidence that the "patriots" understand the maneuvers whereby Washington intends to stifle the liberation movement through the use of "mercenaries"--a policy, he explained, which "Washington calls Vietnamizing the war." Brezhnev said nothing specifically about military action in South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia, but after declaring the USSR's intent to continue its support--described as its "international duty"--to the peoples of Indochina, he said: "The Soviet Union wrathfully condemns the bandit bombings of DRV territory by American aircraft and demands an end to them."\* He went on to express full support for the "just proposals" of the Vietnamese, without mentioning the PRG's seven-point proposal, and to "demand" withdrawal of the "interventionists" and a chance for the Indochinese to shape their own destiny.

Brezhnev did not mention Chinese policy on Indochina, which routine Moscow comment continues to criticize, but his reference to "international duty" in supporting the Indochinese may have had an anti-Chinese thrust. Soviet spokesmen over the years have sporadically talked in this vein, but there appear to have been more uses of the formulation than usual since late summer--at a time when Hanoi had been charging that Peking was departing from the path of proletarian internationalism. Brezhnev had referred to "international duty" in his 11 February greeting to the Versailles antiwar conference and in a 7 December speech at the Polish party congress. The theme was prominent in propaganda surrounding Podgorny's Hanoi visit last September, and it also appeared in Gromyko's 29 September UNGA address.

**SOLIDARITY WEEK**      Some of Moscow's propaganda on the WPC-sponsored 13-19 March "week of solidarity with the peoples of Indochina" contrasts sharply with Brezhnev's relatively restrained

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\* The Moscow embassy has reported that the demand for a halt to the bombing was omitted from the text as published in the Moscow press.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 22 -

remarks on U.S. policy. In addition to the usual publicity for meetings throughout the USSR and messages from public organizations, for the first time the event has been marked--on 18 March--with PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA editorials. This would appear to represent an effort to further highlight Soviet support for the Vietnamese at a time when Hanoi has continued to exhibit disquiet over Peking's rapprochement with the United States.

The PRAVDA editorial was particularly harsh in its denunciation of U.S. actions, asserting that the United States has caused "streams of blood" to be spilled and imposed "tortures and humiliation, grief and misfortune on millions." It sarcastically asked if this is the kind of "civilization" that "imperialist interventionists and their flunkies" represent--language reminiscent of that used by Brezhnev in his report to the CPSU Congress last March. IZVESTIYA also elaborated on "monstrous crimes" perpetrated by the "American militarists" in Indochina, recalling My Lai and the use of "electronic warfare," "gas," "poisons," "torture chambers," and "concentration camps."

Both editorials quoted from past authoritative Soviet statements to underscore the USSR's support for the Indochinese and its reliability as an ally. Asserting that the Soviet Union, "true to the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism," stands "steadfastly on the side of" the Indochinese peoples, PRAVDA recalled Brezhnev's pledge at the CPSU Congress that the USSR would "be an active champion of their just cause"; it noted that Brezhnev's greeting to the Versailles antiwar assembly said that the Indochinese people struggling for national liberation can be confident that the USSR will always be "their reliable ally and comrade-in-arms"; it recalled that the Warsaw Pact states, at their January Political Consultative Committee meeting, had promised to give "the necessary assistance" to the "patriotic forces" of the Indochinese countries; and it quoted Le Duan as having thanked the Soviet Union for its "support." IZVESTIYA quoted Brezhnev's message to the Versailles meeting to the effect that the USSR, "true to the principles of internationalism," calls for a halt to "U.S. aggression" and gives the Indochinese peoples "comprehensive aid and support."

Both editorials denounced alleged U.S. efforts to mask the continuation of aggression behind talk about peace, and both expressed support for the peace plans of the DRV, PRG, NLHS, and FUNK. PRAVDA seemed to allude to President Nixon's talks in Peking when it warned that "neither the 'peace' maneuvers under the guise of 'Vietnamization' nor the attempts of 'mediators' in a settlement" will save U.S. policy; only the Indochinese peoples, PRAVDA said, can decide their own destiny. Routine Moscow comment continues to explicitly raise the possibility that the President concluded a "secret deal" on Indochina while in Peking.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 23 -

## PEKING BANQUET, MESSAGE MARK ANNIVERSARY OF SIHANOUK FRONT

Peking put on a major show of support for Sihanouk's movement in marking the second anniversary of the prince's arrival in Peking after his ouster and of the establishment of his front (FUNK) and liberation army (CNPLAF). A banquet marking the occasion on 19 March was attended by the entire array of fully active Chinese Politburo members, including Chou En-lai and Chiang Ching. A similar banquet last year also saw a major leadership turnout, though that one was not graced by the presence of Mao's wife.

Also like last year, PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and Chou sent a message on the 22d to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth on the FUNK and CNPLAF anniversary. This year's message, however, associates the PRC with the Cambodian war effort in looser terms while again pledging Chinese "all-out support and assistance" to the Cambodian and other Indochinese people. Last year's reference to China as "the great rear area" of the Indochina war is absent this year; and though the current message again calls China and Cambodia "close neighbors," the reference last year to the two peoples as "comrades-in-arms and brothers" is reduced this year to "true friends."

Speaking at the banquet, Chou voiced the strongest Chinese condemnation of Washington's Indochina policies since President Nixon's visit, though the President was spared any direct attack. Chou's speech contained Peking's first criticism of the U.S. eight-point peace proposal since the 19 February PRC Foreign Ministry statement on U.S. bombing of the DRV, issued on the eve of the President's arrival. Warning that the United States is not yet reconciled to its defeats and is stepping up its programs of "Khmerization," "Laotianization," and "Vietnamization" to prolong and intensify the war, Chou labeled the eight-point proposal a "political scheme to dupe the people of the world" and to realize the "criminal aim of forcibly occupying Indochina." Chou concluded by forcefully reiterating Chinese support to the Cambodian and other Indochinese people, declaring that it is "the bounden internationalist duty" of the Chinese to provide "all-out support and assistance" and that this stand is "firm and unshakable."

Chou's speech was most notable for calling "special attention" to what he described as an effort by "certain powers" to promote a compromise in Cambodia that would split the FUNK and "undermine the militant unity of the Cambodian people and the Indochinese

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 24 -

peoples." Chou's unnamed targets are presumably the Soviets and possibly the French as would-be mediators, but his remarks could also be read as a warning to the North Vietnamese not to be enticed into an arrangement that would return Cambodia to the status quo ante but without Sihanouk--an arrangement that would enhance Soviet influence at the expense of the Chinese. Declaring that "this is no longer the time of Munich" and that "these splitting activities" will be firmly opposed by the Cambodian people, Chou invoked the "forceful reply to all conspirators" contained in the 12 February appeal by Sihanouk and Penn Nouth in which they expressed a determination to carry on a "resolute struggle without compromise or retreat."

In the 12 February appeal to the Cambodian people and army to step up their resistance, Sihanouk and Penn Nouth had assailed U.S. "political and diplomatic deceit." denouncing not only the eight-point program but also other "compromise formulas" such as "cease-fire on the spot, peace negotiations, international conference, partition of Cambodia into two parts, referendum, and the government of national reconciliation." The appeal recalled that the "deceptive maneuvers" had also been denounced in three recent RGNU statements, which had appeared during a period which also saw a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on 1 February dismissing "fabricated reports" that Hanoi had engaged in indirect approaches to Phnom Penh concerning a "separate peace in Cambodia." The DRV statement charged, among other things, that the "trick" of the United States and the Phnom Penh "puppets" was aimed at "dividing the socialist countries"--an apparent allusion to the role reputedly played by the Soviets in facilitating the contacts.

For his part, Sihanouk used the banquet to deliver a paean to the "unshakable and indomitable fidelity" of his Peking patrons and to reaffirm his intransigent rejection of any negotiated or compromise settlement in Cambodia. Like Chou, he assailed "certain foreign powers" for seeking to promote "a so-called 'Khmer third force'" to negotiate a settlement. But where Chou referred to Munich in denouncing a compromise on Cambodia, Sihanouk more pointedly reiterated his opposition to a new Geneva-type conference.

Sihanouk was also more pointed than Chou in critically alluding to the Soviets when he observed that "contrary to the PRC and 27 other countries" which have recognized the RGNU, "certain powers claiming to 'love peace, freedom, and justice' are increasing their hostility" to the FUNK and RGNU. He charged that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 25 -

these unnamed powers, "which are accomplices of U.S. imperialism," are using dishonorable "political, diplomatic, and other means" to discredit his government and to praise "the illegal, anticonstitutional, antipopular, antinational, pro-imperialist, fascist, and archcriminal" regime of Lon Nol.

VIETNAM While Peking was lavishly feting Sihanouk on the ANTI-U.S. DAY FUNK anniversary, it gave minimal attention to the 19 March Vietnam "anti-U.S. day." Peking's downplaying of the anniversary this year accords with its continuing circumspection in commenting on the United States and may reflect the strains in Sino-Vietnamese relations arising from President Nixon's visit to the PRC. The only attention Peking gave to the Vietnamese anniversary were reports of activities in Vietnam, a press conference by the PRG ambassador in Peking, and also a film reception hosted by the DRV ambassador. NCNA in Chinese, but not in English, also carried "international reference material" on the anniversary. This treatment contrasts with that of last year, which included a Peking rally attended by Li Hsien-nien and addressed by a deputy chief of the PLA General Staff. In 1969 and 1970 Peking had treated the anniversary much as it did this year, but in prior years it had given the occasion prominent attention, including a rally addressed by Chou En-lai and editorial comment.

#### SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT, DRV, PRC CONDEMN INCURSION INTO CAMBODIA

A protest by Sihanouk's government (RGNU) condemning Saigon's military operation in Cambodia which began on 10 March has been supported as usual by official DRV and PRC statements. A RGNU spokesman's statement on the 15th denounces the "invasion" of Cambodia by "U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, the Saigon puppet troops." The RGNU normally comments officially on such military operations. Thus, the "U.S.-Saigon invasion of Cambodia" launched on 22 November 1971 was condemned in a 25 November RGNU Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement and a 28 November statement by the RGNU Information and Propaganda Ministry.

According to the recent statement, the "new military adventure" confirms the expansion of President Nixon's Vietnamization policy and exposes his "deceitful utterances" about seeking peace in Asia and reducing tension in this part of the world. The statement exudes confidence, however, asserting that the Cambodian people and armed forces, "marching forward on the crest of victory," will "frustrate all aggression by the U.S. imperialists and their Saigon

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 26 -

and Bangkok allies." It repeats demands that the United States withdraw American and "satellite" troops immediately, totally, and unconditionally and stop "all aid, assistance, and support to the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh clique," allowing the Cambodian people to settle their own affairs on the basis of Sihanouk's five-point statement of 23 March 1970 and the FUNK political program.

DRV SUPPORT Hanoi as usual supported the RGNU with a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement dated the 19th. The DRV had similarly supported the RGNU statement of 25 November. The current DRV statement reiterates the line that the mobilization of Saigon troops in coordination with the U.S. air force to launch aggression against Cambodia once again "exposes the U.S. imperialists' bellicose, aggressive face and President Nixon's deceitful allegations on peace and on the U.S. effort to 'ease' the present tense situation." It echoes the RGNU in charging that the U.S. imperialists are trying to maintain the "Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh clique" and carry out a policy of "pitting Indochinese against Indochinese," the Saigon "puppets" being used as a "tool" in carrying out the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine. The DRV statement expresses confidence in the Cambodian people's ability to deal "punishing blows" to the aggressors and loyalty to the joint declaration of the summit conference of the Indochinese people.

PRC SUPPORT Peking seconded the RGNU statement with a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 16th, the third authoritative Chinese comment on Indochina since President Nixon's visit. On the 10th a PRC Foreign Ministry statement supported a DRV condemnation of U.S. air strikes, and on the 12th a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article supported a Pathet Lao denunciation of U.S. action in Laos. The most recent PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on Cambodia was on 27 January, scoring the "border security agreement" concluded between Phnom Penh and Bangkok. Previously, Peking supported the RGNU's protests of the November Saigon incursions into Cambodia with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article rather than an official statement.

The 16 March Chinese statement reflects Peking's continuing practice of restraint toward the Nixon Administration, failing (unlike Hanoi) to follow the Cambodian statement's lead in dismissing the President's professions of interest in peace as deceitful. The handling of the Chinese statement also affords a glimpse into the workings of the propaganda apparatus as it implements policy guidelines striking a balance between Peking's

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FRIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 27 -

Interests vis-a-vis the United States and those of its allies. In the ~~statement~~ Peking does not directly denounce the Nixon Administration on its own authority, as the Cambodian and DRV statements do. The version of the statement originally carried by NCNA in both Chinese and English cited the Cambodian statement as condemning "U.S. imperialism," but reruns by NCNA changed that to "Nixon Administration." The propaganda apparatus evidently been instructed to avoid direct attacks on the President but to give some publicity to such attacks in the name of Peking's allies.

While refraining from attacking Washington's stand on a peace settlement, the Chinese statement echoes the RGNU's demands that the United States withdraw from Cambodia immediately, totally, and unconditionally, stop its air raids, cease support for the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh "clique," and allow the Cambodian people to settle their own affairs on the basis of Sihanouk's 23 March 1970 declaration and the political program of the FUNK. It lauds the current "excellent" situation of Cambodia's war, pointing to the "disastrous defeats" of the U.S. aggressors and lackeys and the "chaos" of the Lon Nol regime.

#### — DPRK SIGNS MILITARY AID AGREEMENT WITH SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT

North Korea demonstrated its support of Sihanouk's government (RGNU), following Peking's lead in signing an agreement on "military aid" to Cambodia on 16 March. Peking had signed an agreement on economic and military aid on 11 February. Although Peking had concluded a previous military aid agreement with the RGNU in August 1970, there is no available report of any previous North Korean agreement.

The agreement was concluded during the 15-18 March visit to North Korea of a RGNU military delegation led by Duong Sam Ol, FUNK Politburo member and RGNU Minister of Military Equipment and Armament. The group received high-level treatment in Pyongyang, including a meeting with First Vice Premier Kim Il on the 17th for a "friendly conversation." DPRK Chief of General Staff Gen. O Chin-u addressed a banquet for the visiting Cambodians on the 15th, and Foreign Minister Ho Tam received the group for a "friendly talk" on the 16th and attended a banquet hosted by the Cambodians on the following day.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIF TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 28 -

## DRV CONDEMNS U.S. AIR STRIKES AGAINST NORTH DURING MARCH

In its seventh foreign ministry spokesman's protest issued this month, the DRV condemned U.S. strikes against Quang Binh and Vinh Linh.\* The statement, released on the 17th, charged that from 12-15 March, U.S. artillery "south of the demilitarized zone and aboard warships offshore, indiscriminately shelled Vinh Giang, Vinh Thanh, Vinh Quang, and Vinh Son villages inside the DMZ, on DRV territory." In addition it said that from 14-16 March, U.S. planes "bombed and strafed a number of places in Quang Binh Province and Vinh Linh zone."

On 16 March, VNA publicized a DRV War Crimes Commission "special communique" which "strongly condemned" the Nixon Administration for its continuous bombings against the DRV from 1-10 March. (At the Paris session on the 16th DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy, citing the communique, dated it as 11 March, although the VNA account gives no date.) The communique charged among other things that the bombings killed 50 people and injured 100 others. It particularly scored the "deliberate" U.S. attacks on civilian targets and said that the "fresh war acts again lay bare the extremely bellicose, stubborn and cruel nature" of the United States as well as the "deceitfulness of the Nixon Administration's professions about peace."

Like the 6 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement, the communique called the strikes "a gross violation" of the DRV's sovereignty and security, "a cynical infringement" on the U.S. commitment to end the bombing of the DRV, and an "impudent challenge to the world and progressive opinion in the United States."

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\* The series of protests began with two spokesman's statements on the 4th, followed by statements on the 5th, 8th, 9th and 10th as well as a higher-level DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 6th. See the TRENDS of 8 March, pages 19-21, and 15 March, page 3.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 29 -

# PARIS: U.S. "STEP-UP OF WAR," "SABOTAGE" OF TALKS ASSAILED

VNA's account of the 146th session of the Paris talks on 16 March says the session was held "after two weeks' delay due to the U.S. and Saigon delegations' unilateral decision to postpone it under absurd pretexts." There is, of course, no acknowledgment of the U.S. and Saigon delegates' criticisms of the communists for having walked out of the 145th session on 24 February.

VNA typically obscures the fact that the allied delegates spoke first. After summarizing the communists' statements, the account concludes with a single sentence on Ambassador Porter's statement and ignores the GVN delegate's remarks completely. The U.S. delegation, VNA says, "stuck to the 'eight-point plan' and repeated Nixon's statement on the so-called 'POW's week' to elude a positive response to the fair and reasonable solution of the PRG." VNA gave no indication that in additional remarks Ambassador Porter appealed for improved treatment of the prisoners, including visits by impartial observers in return for an agreement by both sides to refrain from attempted rescue missions.

The VNA account reports that PRG deputy delegation head Nguyen Van Tien (still substituting for Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh,\* who has been absent since August) and DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy (substituting for Xuan Thuy, who VNA noted was absent) "strongly condemned the United States for intensifying the war and seriously sabotaging the Paris conference step by step." Both delegates made thinly veiled allusions to the President's China trip, but the VNA account does not reflect them: Tien said the intensification of the war has "unmasked Mr. Nixon's recent hypocritical statements that his goal is to establish a world system of 'peace and justice' and that he thinks of 'all the children in the world.'" Vy mentioned Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green's Asian tour and noted that Green had reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Saigon.

Both communist delegates called for a U.S. response to the PRG's seven-point proposal, including the elaborations of 2 February. But in line with other recent propaganda, neither spelled out the "two key points" in detail. The 19 March NHAN DAN and 18 March LPA editorials on anti-U.S. day refer to the seven-point

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\* An AFP dispatch from Hanoi on 22 March said that Mme. Binh had left on Monday for Paris via Peking and Moscow.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 30 -

solution with its "two key elaborations" as the correct means for negotiation, but without spelling out the substance. And the 20 March Liberation Radio commentary on the Nixon Doctrine cites only general demands. It says that if the President wants to end the war, he must "seriously negotiate" on the basis of the seven-point proposal, end Vietnamization, "promptly" withdraw all U.S. troops, and end the air war and his support for the Thieu administration.

Both Tien and Vy at the Paris session dismissed the U.S. eight-point plan as a way to continue Vietnamization, and Vy noted that it had been rejected by the Vietnamese people. The Liberation Radio commentary of the 20th said that there can be no serious negotiations if the Nixon Administration "stubbornly clings to this arch-reactionary plan."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 31 -

## MIDDLE EAST

## BREZHNEV LAUDS TIES WITH ARABS; USSR CAUTIOUS ON HUSAYN PLAN

Brezhnev in his trade unions congress address on the 20th underlined the Arab countries' demonstration of readiness for a political settlement of the Middle East conflict while routinely attacking Israel's "aggressive policy of conquest," maintained with the "support and connivance" of the United States. Brezhnev made no reference to Security Council Resolution 242 or to the mission of Ambassador Jarring, which continues to be supported in routine propaganda. He declared that "sober-minded politicians" could hardly expect the Arab states to tolerate occupation of their territories indefinitely, and went on to stress the changes in the Arab world in the past several years.

In keeping with the current propaganda focus on these themes, Brezhnev maintained that "progressive regimes" in the Arab world have been strengthened and inter-Arab cooperation has expanded, and the "military defense potential" of the Arab countries "has grown considerably." These long-term factors, he added, will determine the alignment of forces in the Middle East. Stressing Soviet-Arab cooperation, along the lines of recent comment, Brezhnev affirmed that the USSR's broad and "profound" relations with "progressive" Arab states were increasing, and he cited strengthened economic and defense cooperation and political interaction.

A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 21st claimed that Brezhnev's remarks about Middle East events were considered in the Arab world as a "serious warning" to Israel and its "imperialist protectors." The broadcast added that this warning was "also addressed to those aggressive circles, both within and outside Israel," which are increasing tension in the Middle East.

TASS on the 22d reported a statement on the Middle East adopted by the AUCCTU congress condemning Israel's "aggressive policy" carried out with "direct support from U.S. imperialism and the forces of international Zionism." The statement routinely voiced support for the Arab struggle and expressed the Soviet working people's "concern and indignation" over Israeli actions "blocking all proposals and initiatives for a political settlement" of the conflict. It issued a standard call for implementation of Resolution 242 and expressed confidence that the Arab people, including the Palestinians, would achieve their "legitimate rights and interests."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 32 -

HUSAYN      Moscow has reacted warily to King Husayn's 15 March  
PLAN          proposal to give Jordan a federal structure as the  
                United Arab Kingdom consisting of two regions--the  
                Palestine region comprising the Israeli-occupied West Bank and  
                "any other Palestinian territories" wishing to join, and the  
                Jordan region, comprising the East Bank. The minimal propaganda  
                has been largely confined to reporting the negative and critical  
                Arab reaction. While Soviet commentators have been espousing  
                Arab unity, Moscow has failed to acknowledge Iraq's proposal on  
                the 15th, following Husayn's announcement, of an "immediate  
                unity project" with Egypt and Syria and Baghdad's subsequent  
                moves to consult with Cairo and Damascus on this idea.

Moscow's first reaction to the Husayn proposal, a multi-dated TASS item on the 15th published in PRAVDA the following day, outlined the plan and summed up initial adverse reaction from the Arabs. TASS reported from Beirut that the Palestinian organization Fatah believed the purpose of the plan to be the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance movement. TASS, citing a New York TIMES report, said Palestinian Arabs in occupied Jordan believed Israel had reached a secret agreement with Husayn on settling the status of the occupied Jordanian territories; in Cairo, TASS added, AL-AHRAM expressed fear that a "certain deal" with U.S. participation was behind the plan. Briefly reporting further foreign reaction on the 16th, TASS noted that State Department officials refused to comment on the plan, which they said would "receive a measured and thoughtful response in due course." According to the Washington POST, TASS said, U.S. officials wished to dissociate the United States from the proposal, which would be explained to President Nixon by Husayn during a visit to Washington in late March.

Subsequently, TASS on the 19th summed up in two paragraphs the statement issued the previous day by the Presidential Council of the Confederation of Arab Republics (CAR) in which the Egyptian, Syrian, and Libyan presidents "categorically rejected" Husayn's plan. TASS noted that the statement assessed the project as providing new opportunities for imperialist and Zionist penetration in the Middle East, declared that the United States was behind Jordan's proposal, and condemned U.S. policy in the region. A Moscow domestic service commentary on the 19th pegged to the recent CAR Presidential Council meetings in Cairo routinely accused Israel of trying to undermine Arab unity and remarked that "one should examine in this light the appearance . . . of the idea of setting up a so-called united kingdom of Jordan as a smokescreen to preserve Israeli occupation of the West Bank."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 33 -

Moscow broadcasts in Arabic on the 16th, 18th, and 20th reported Arab opposition to the plan. The item on the 16th was drawn from the initial TASS report, while that on the 18th noted "violent reaction as well as opposition among wide Arab circles." Radio and press commentaries in Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Iraq, the broadcast said, express anxiety that the plan could be a step toward an individual agreement between Jordan and Israel. The radio added that "most representatives" of Palestinian organizations have deplored and rejected the plan, and pointed out that the Arab press referred to the "positive reaction" with which the proposal was received in the United States.

#### PEKING DENOUNCES HUSAYN PLAN, EAST EUROPEAN MEDIA CRITICAL

A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 18 March set the stage for PRC condemnation of the 15 March plan "dished up" by Husayn to liquidate the revolutionary cause of the Palestinian people, split the unity between the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, and undermine the struggle against "U.S.-Israeli aggression." The same day, NCNA rounded up "vehement" objections to the plan by Palestinian fedayeen organizations and noted that the proposal also met with strong opposition from "some Arab governments," citing official statements by South Yemen and Iraq. (NCNA failed to note that the Iraqi statement proposed "immediate unity" with Syria and Egypt.) And on the 19th, NCNA reported that Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei met with Arab diplomats and the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization mission in Peking for a briefing by the Arabs on the plan. Denouncing this "plot," Chi affirmed to the envoys Chinese support for the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their struggle against aggression and Peking's belief that the national rights of the Palestinian people must be restored and "Israeli Zionism" must withdraw from occupied Arab territories.

The Commentator article accused Israel and Jordan of collusion in presenting an old conspiracy under a new label. It described the Husayn plan as a refurbished version of "the 'Kingdom of Jordan and Palestine' project put forward by the Jordanian reactionaries" in 1970 and also a reproduction of the "notorious 'Alon plan'" of Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Alon in 1968. Commentator claimed that the plan of the "Jordanian reactionaries" was jointly prepared by "imperialism and Israeli Zionism," but the article did not directly involve the United States in the proposal. The NCNA roundup on the 18th observed that the Big Four, who were informed in advance of the contents of the plan, had declined comment or remained silent, with the exception of France. In

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 34 -

accompanying propaganda, Peking has played up denunciation of the plan by Palestinian organizations and by press, mass organizations, and public opinion in the Arab world. And NCNA on the 18th provided "reference material" on Husayn's "secret talks" with Israeli leaders since 1968 and on the Alon plan.

EAST            Unlike Moscow, the East Europeans--with the exception  
EUROPE        of Romania, which apparently has not commented--have promptly and uniformly criticized Husayn's proposal, suggesting that there must have been prior consultations and perhaps agreements with Israel, and assessing the plan as a sell-out of the Palestinian cause. There has also been speculation, as from Bulgaria's RABOTNICHESKO DELO and Prague radio, on prior U.S. concurrence in the proposal. The Prague RUDE PRAVO objected on the 17th that the proposal disrupts Arab unity, liquidates the Palestinian resistance movement, and attempts to disqualify other peace initiatives, foremost the Jarring mission. The Bratislava PRAVDA, also on the 17th, viewed Husayn as closer "in class terms" to the Israeli Government than to the Palestine resistance.

Polish papers, reviewed by PAP on the 16th, noted that Husayn failed to consult with his Arab partners, ZYCIE WARSZAWY asking how the king could publish a plan concerning occupied areas without mentioning the need to liberate this territory or continue the struggle against Israel. The EXPRESS WIECZORNY declared that Husayn had outdone himself with this "outright sellout of the Arab people," and added that it was commonly believed in the Middle East that Husayn did not want the Israelis to leave the occupied areas at all, but regarded them as his allies guarding his throne. And SLOWO POWSZECHNE, reviewed by PAP on the 17th, said the "infernal" and "perfidious" plan might serve as an overture to a separate peace with Israel, and described the proposal as a "successful subversion" of the Palestinian problem.

A central press service commentary carried by Budapest's MTI on the 16th also saw the king's plan as in essence directed toward dissolution of the Palestine national liberation movement. Like some other East European comment, it professed to see in it similarities with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Alon's plan, and recalled reports of Israeli officials' meetings with Husayn.

An East Berlin domestic service commentary on the 16th provided the only available acknowledgment in East European media of the Iraqi proposal for union with Egypt and Syria, in the course of noting that Iraq was the only Arab cabinet to have released an official statement on "the so-called Husayn plan." Remarking

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 35 -

that possibly Egypt was waiting to hear explanations from an envoy of Husayn; the radio pointed out that Egyptian media were reflecting the anger and concern of Middle East progressive forces over a plan "which indicates the handwriting of the American-Israeli alliance despite the seal of a Jordanian king."

The Belgrade BORBA, reviewed by TANJUG on the 16th, called the move a "sly step" and a new direction of attack against the Palestinian movement; Husayn, it said, proposed to the Palestinians limited autonomy within the framework of a federal kingdom, rather than their long-standing aim of a state of their own. Other Yugoslav press comment also assumed that the plan was not announced without "collusion with the other side" and without taking into account Washington's interests, and saw the Husayn proposal as a variation of the Alon plan.

Tirana radio on the 16th typically assailed the "Amman fascist clique" for betraying the Palestinian people and the entire Arab nation. It accused Amman and Tel Aviv of putting into implementation a bilateral agreement after "long and secret discussions," with Washington "standing behind this great plot."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 36 -

## SOUTH ASIA

### USSR, PAKISTAN MOVE TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS

Following an initially cool and hesitant posture toward Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's 16-18 March "official visit" to Moscow, Soviet media noticeably warmed as the first day of talks indicated that Soviet-Pakistani relations were headed back toward normalization.\* Confirming this trend, Brezhnev received Bhutto on the 17th for "a friendly talk."

The 18 March joint communique characterized the talks "about the present-day state and further development of Soviet-Pakistani relations" as "a frank and useful exchange of opinions." Bhutto in a luncheon speech on the 17th said that "constructive conversations" had taken place in "an atmosphere of frankness, cordiality, and understanding." Kosygin, addressing the same luncheon, expressed the hope that "the exchange of opinions . . . will permit us to find a common viewpoint on questions of the development of bilateral Soviet-Pakistani relations, a political settlement in Hindustan, and also on other international problems."

While the normalization of Soviet-Pakistani relations has begun and common viewpoints exist on a number of international problems, Moscow and Islamabad chose not to commit to public record in the communique their views on the specifics of the South Asian situation. Kosygin's call for talks among the three states of the subcontinent was countered by Bhutto's expressions of concern over the fate of the Pakistani prisoners of war and the Biharis in Bangladesh. The single brief paragraph on South Asia in the joint communique simply called for the establishment of "peaceful conditions in the subcontinent," without mentioning talks, prisoners of war, or Biharis.

**BILATERAL RELATIONS**      The current state of Soviet-Pakistani relations was portrayed by Kosygin--in a speech to a Bhutto-hosted luncheon on the 17th--as frank but friendly. Observing that the talks had indicated that both sides "are interested in creating conditions for the development of goodneighborly relations

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\* For comparison, see the 8 March TRENDS, pages 24-28, for an analysis of Soviet-Bangladesh relations in light of Bangladesh Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman's 1-5 March "official friendly visit" to the Soviet Union.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 37 -

between both countries" and that "we sincerely want Soviet-Pakistani relations to be friendly and based on broad mutual understanding," Kosygin declared that "we wish the Pakistani people well, nothing less, and we wish them successes in the implementation of social and economic reforms and in the extension of democratic principles in social life." Bhutto in his speech asserted that "friendly relations between us should not be built at the expense of our friendly relations with other countries."

The joint communique registered both sides' desire "to further strengthen" bilateral relations and noted that it was therefore "found advisable to hold regularly exchanges of opinion between the two governments on questions of mutual interest." The communique did not go on, as did the 3 March Soviet-Bangladesh joint declaration marking Mujibur Rahman's visit to the Soviet Union, to elaborate on the manner or level of the consultations.

The communique noted agreement to "restore" Soviet-Pakistani trade, economic, scientific, technical, and other relations "that were interrupted as a result of the well-known events in that region in 1971."

Speaking two days after Bhutto's departure, Brezhnev stressed that "we stand also for good relations with Pakistan, with which we have no conflicts and no conflicting interests." He added that Bhutto's visit "showed that all the necessary preconditions exist for a development of good relations between our countries."

SOUTH ASIA      On the situation in South Asia, Kosygin in his luncheon speech strongly defended past Soviet policy, avoided placing any culpability for the crisis on Bhutto, called for talks between the three involved states, and advised Bhutto to work toward such talks. The Soviets' "frank" assessment of the Asian crisis, Kosygin explained, was that it was a "clash of opposite forces": the forces of "national liberation" against the forces of "the antipopular military dictatorship, which had closed ranks with foreign aggressive circles hostile to the peoples of Hindustan, including the Pakistani people." Recalling the Soviet efforts to effect a peaceful settlement through talks between the interested sides, Kosygin declared that "if history were to be repeated, we would adopt the same position because we are convinced of its correctness."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 38 -

Kosygin renewed his call for "talks between the states of this region themselves"--a call made in his 14 March speech at a luncheon for the Afghan prime minister--and noted that Indira Gandhi, Mujibur Rahman, and Bhutto himself were "all in favor of this." Asking rhetorically "What is hampering progress?" Kosygin answered "clearly, the absence of agreement on talks," which in turn is "hampered by the absence of mutual trust, and without a minimum of trust it is hard to hope for a solution of existing problems." Kosygin pointedly stated: "We duly assess your statement, Mr. President, on the Pakistani Government's readiness to begin talks with the governments of India and Bangladesh on questions of normalizing the situation in Hindustan," and "we hope that the Pakistani Government will display a realistic approach in this important matter."

Although the communique noted that "much attention" in the Bhutto-Kosygin talks was devoted to "the exchange of opinions on the situation in the South Asian subcontinent and on other international problems," only one brief paragraph dealt with the subcontinent. It registered Bhutto's statement that "he is prepared to take steps to help establish peaceful conditions on the subcontinent," adding that "in this connection he attaches great importance to the ending of hostile propaganda by the countries of the subcontinent against each other." The communique contained no reference to Kosygin's call for talks between the involved states nor to Bhutto's concern--expressed in his speech on the 17th but not mentioned by Kosygin--on the prisoner-of-war issue or on the position of the Biharis in Bangladesh.

INTERNATIONAL TOPICS      The joint communique registered an "identity or closeness of views of the governments of the USSR and Pakistan on the majority of topical international problems." Those topics included the Middle East, Indochina, the arms race and disarmament measures including control of chemical and biological weapons, colonialism, racism, apartheid, and the United Nations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 39 -

## CLOSE SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS OVERSHADOW MINOR DIFFERENCES

Moscow's cordial reception of Afghan Prime Minister Abdol Zaher during his 14-22 March "official friendly visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government" testified to continuing close Soviet-Afghan relations despite the existence of differences on a few issues. Following two days of talks in Moscow with top Soviet political and economic leaders, including Kosygin, Brezhnev, Novikov, Baybakov, Gromyko, Patolichev, and Arkhipov, the Afghan prime minister visited Sochi, Tashkent, and Samarkand. A joint communique issued on 22 March, the day of his return to Kabul, said that the talks had taken place in "an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding" and had involved "a useful exchange of views" on "questions of further developing friendly Soviet-Afghan relations, as well as on topical international problems of mutual interest." This characterization was virtually identical to the 20 September communique's description of Soviet-Afghan talks during Afghan King Mohammad Zahir Shah's visit to the Soviet Union.

In speeches at a Soviet-hosted luncheon on the 14th both Kosygin and Abdol Zaher acclaimed the closeness and stability of Soviet-Afghan relations; TASS on the 15th called them "a model of good relations between states." Pointing out that "there are not many countries with differing social systems in the world which have had such lasting, fruitful, and mutual relations based on equality in their foreign policy activity," Kosygin took particular note of "the tranquil situation which has existed for many years now on the Soviet-Afghan border." He added, without reference to particular situations, that both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan "would also like peace and stability to determine the situation on the borders with our countries' other neighbors." Kosygin also paid tribute to the "realistic course" of Afghanistan's foreign policy and went on to comment in this context on Indochina and the Middle East. Kosygin also called for talks between the involved parties in the Asian subcontinent and reiterated Soviet interest in a collective security system for Asia.

According somewhat less attention to Soviet-Afghan relations but expressing proper gratitude for Soviet aid, Abdol Zaher revealed that while relations between the two neighbors were close, differences remained. He stated that the viewpoints of Moscow and Kabul "on a number of very important international problems are very similar, and on other problems the sides well understand one another's positions." In a similar reflection

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 40 -

of the absence of overall agreement, the joint communique issued at the end of the 14-19 September visit of the Afghan king had registered "a coincidence or closeness of positions" between the two countries "on the major problems of the present-day international situation." The current communique contains no similar statement. While the September communique noted that the two sides "exchanged views" on the explosive East Pakistani situation, this communique said that the current situation there was "discussed," with both sides determined "to continue efforts directed at preserving and strengthening peace in that area" and seeking "a stabilization of the situation." It contained no call for talks between the involved states.

Citing a major Afghan concern--which Kosygin had not mentioned--Abdol Zaher stated that with respect to "the only problem existing between Afghanistan and Pakistan--the Pushtunistan problem," Afghanistan advocated a solution "on the basis of the Pushtun people's rights to decide their own destiny." He stated that Afghanistan "supports and will continue to support the lawful aspirations of the fraternal Pushtun people," and concluded that the Pushtun problems "constitute a serious political difference of opinion between Afghanistan and Pakistan." By raising this issue just two days prior to Bhutto's arrival in Moscow, perhaps the Afghan prime minister hoped to persuade the Soviets to broach the issue in their talks with Bhutto.

#### MOSCOW HAILS GANDHI ELECTION VICTORY IN INDIA

Moscow has registered its full approval of the "convincing," "decisive," and "landslide victory" of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Indian National Congress Party in the early March elections of representatives to the legislative assemblies of 16 states and two union territories. Declaring that "the forces of reaction took a smashing defeat"--with the Swatantra Party "virtually passing out of national politics" and the "syndicate" (the former right wing of the Congress Party) "completely losing its position"--Moscow maintained that the elections "confirmed a noticeable shift to the left in Indian public opinion."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MARCH 1972

- 41 -

Moscow credited the "spectacular" victory to the Indian people's widespread endorsement of Mrs. Gandhi's domestic and foreign policies, which have "regained for the National Congress the trust of the electorate already demonstrated at last year's March elections to the lower house of the central parliament." A 16 March IZVESTIYA article noted that Indian commentators linked the election outcome to the "big changes in the country's political life" which have manifested themselves in the past three years, particularly measures "directed at limiting the power of big capital." TASS on the same day noted that the Indian voters had entrusted the Congress Party with "the task of implementing the specific programs of radical social and economic transformations in the country." Support for the "cause of national liberation" and the strengthening of "comprehensive relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries" were the foreign policies which received voter approval, according to Soviet media. A 14 March Radio Moscow commentary broadcast in English to South Asia contended that the ruling party's popularity was "cemented by the firm, principled stand taken by the government during the aggravated situation on the subcontinent while the ruling circles of the United States and Peking applied military and political pressure on India."

While obviously not enthusiastic about the showing of the Soviet-leaning Communist Party of India (CPI)--which captured 112 seats compared to the 1,926 seats won by the Congress Party--Moscow credited the CPI with a "bold showing" in the election. TASS noted that the election manifesto of the CPI "consistently upheld the interests of the working masses," and Moscow radio said the CPI "campaigned for a fight against reaction and for radical social and economic reforms." A Moscow Radio Peace and Progress broadcast on 17 March observed that the CPI had sought to unite "all of the leftwing and democratic forces for the struggle for radical structural reforms and for the anti-imperialist and antifeudal campaign," adding that in several states the CPI and the Congress Party had formed "one bloc" which "undoubtedly helped to isolate and rout the reactionaries."

The only available Soviet reference to the more leftist Communist Party of India/Marxist, which suffered a disastrous defeat in the West Bengal elections after being the largest party there previously, was contained in a 17 March TASS report on the final election returns. In listing the results, TASS noted that "the parallel communist party" had received 34 seats nationwide.

CONFIDENTIAL